The Italians also used gas grenades to clear their way. With further battles in October and November 1916, the Italians managed to secure advantageous positions at the price of terrible losses. Notwithstanding that, Cadorna attacked from other sectors of the front, trying to achieve better positions on the Carso plateau. All Cadorna’s attempts to exploit the breakthrough and extend the offensive towards the hills surrounding the city ended in failure. However, the surrounding territory did not offer important strategic targets and generated a new stalemate. With the occupation of the city and the important Mount Sabotino, the Italians were able to control the area. The victory was obtained thanks to important improvements: the massive use of heavy trench mortars and the sheer numbers, totaling 300,000 men, overwhelmed Austrian defenses. On 6 August 1916, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the Italian 3 rd Army managed to surprise the Austrians and forced them to abandon Gorizia, occupying it on 10 August 1916. The intelligence was also improved.Īfter a first clash in April 1916, in which both sides used land mines and the Austrians used gas, a major goal was achieved with the sixth battle. The artillery was reinforced with training and supplies that consisted of 2,200 light and medium guns and around 2,200 heavy guns the infantry adopted light machine guns. On the Italian side, Emanuele Filiberto di Savoia, Duca d’Aosta (1869-1931) and commander of the 3 rd Army, was now in charge of any offensive against Gorizia. Furthermore, they planned to use poison gas for counterattacks. Concrete and iron structures replaced previous rock-based protections. The Austrians reinforced their trenches on the Carso plateau and at the Gorizia bridgehead. The armies on both sides suffered significant losses during 1915 and used the first months of 1916 to reorganize and strengthen their positions. The Wave of 1916 and the Conquest of Gorizia ↑ Reorganization Efforts ↑ Notwithstanding that, he encouraged the offensive efforts of Cadorna in order to keep the Austro-Hungarians under pressure. In the wider context, French General Joseph Joffre (1852-1931) realized that no major breakthrough was possible on the Italian front. On the other side of the front, the Austrians could not take advantage of high Italian losses because their numerical inferiority and the damages from Italian artillery prevented them from organizing any successful counterattack. The artillery’s inefficacy, difficult terrain and the predictability of the Italian attacks represented the biggest liability for Cadorna’s plans.ĭeserters, Losses and Stabilizing the Front ↑ĭeserters represented an important factor during the first assaults the high losses led many soldiers to escape when a new offensive was about to start, thus giving the Austrians important information on the Italian plans. These attempts continued until December 1915. This decision was senseless from a strategic point of view, but represented the ideal symbolic aim to gain popular support for the war. Thus, Cadorna decided to focus all his efforts on the conquest of Gorizia and strengthening the southern part of the front towards Trieste. The Italian artillery proved inadequate on this occasion, with short artillery barrages due to the lack of ammunition. The first attack started on 23 June 1915 with the artillery hitting the Austrian defenses and the 2 nd Army moving towards Gorizia, while the 3 rd Army tried to move towards the Carso plateau. Cadorna mistakenly thought he could compensate these weaknesses with numerical superiority and soldiers’ motivation. Ammunition and machine guns were also in low supply early in the war this problem was only resolved in 1916. The artillery proved to be inefficient in the first phase of war, consisting of around 2,200 pieces, mostly light 75mm guns. In fact, the Italians suffered from poor logistics and a lack of modern weapons, like machine guns. However, the enemy’s resistance proved to be stronger than expected and prevented the Italians from implementing their initial plan of an easy advance to Ljubljana. The primary objective was to drive the Austrians away from their main defensive line. The First Wave: 23 June – 15 December 1915 ↑ Underestimating the Enemy ↑Īfter the start of Italian military operations on, the commander in chief General Luigi Cadorna (1850-1928) decided to prepare a wide and massive offensive.
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